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I
n 2004, the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) standardized e-passports by specifying 
how to implement and protect machine-readable 
travel documents (http://mrtd.icao.int).1,2 However, 
many countries had to generate their e-passports in a rush, 
under pressure by a US visa-waiver 
policy change that mandated all for-
eign passports be machine-readable. 
Ideally, e-passports will substantially 
improve border security, but at what 
cost to passport-holder privacy?
E-passports have an embedded 
contact-less chip that can be read 
by radio from up to a few centi-
meters away (although boosted 
readers can scan them from a few 
meters). The ICAO chose this 
technology over magnetic strips 
and 2D barcodes because it pro-
vides reliable connection, large 
memory capacity, random access, 
and rewritable memory.
However, an open question re-
mains—what happens if the chip 
doesn’t respond at border control? 
Chips can malfunction, especially 
if they’re grilled by electromag-
netic waves either by accident 
or an active attack. In theory, an 
e-passport remains valid even if 
the chip doesn’t respond, but the 
holder is likely to waste a lot of 
time at immigration offices. Some 
people have opted to break the 
law to protect their privacy by de-
stroying their passport chips with 
a hammer, a microwave, or a pho-
tograph flash. But let’s assume for a 
moment that people can peaceful-
ly live with their e-passports: what 
sort of cryptography technology 
is involved here? Can e-passport 
holders protect their privacy with-
out resorting to subterfuge?
RFID for dummies
As with many other RFID devices, 
the chip in e-passports uses a 32-
bit number for collision avoidance. 
(Indeed, if we give two e-pass-
ports to a reader simultaneously, 
it should be able to select which 
one to scan first.) Some countries 
(such as New Zealand and Italy) 
use a constant number, so that any 
scanner can easily track e-passport 
holders. Other countries use a 
constantly changing random num-
ber for privacy protection. The 
ISO 14443 standard specifies that 
random numbers should start with 
byte 08, but some people claim that 
starting with this byte clearly indi-
cates that the device reveals itself as 
a potential target. For this reason, 
some countries (such as Australia) 
have opted to use a random byte, 
but this doesn’t always give the in-
tended protection—a constantly 
changing number that doesn’t start 
with byte 08 might implicitly in-
dicate that the chip belongs to, say, 
an Australian passport. This type 
of privacy protection mechanism 
is effective only when it’s univer-
sally and uniformly implemented, 
even in RFID tags that don’t re-
quire privacy protection.
After solving collisions, a reader 
can either dump the memory or go 
through an access control protocol 
(if such a feature is implemented). As 
far as my colleagues and I know,3,4 
every country has implemented Ba-
sic Access Control, a protocol that 
ensures the reader already knows to 
which e-passport it is “talking,” and 
in particular, that it knows the pass-
port’s number, its expiration date, 
and the holder’s date of birth. The 
reader optically scans this informa-
tion from the machine readable zone 
(MRZ) inside the passport, which is 
why some people think that the chip 
can’t be accessed when the passport is 
closed, although this clearly isn’t true. 
The chip can be read when the reader 
knows this information, whether it’s 
from reading it when the passport is 
open, “remembering” it, or guessing 
it because the entropy isn’t high.5–7 
Anyone can easily build an e-pass-
port reader, and if you’re okay with 
using it at a distance of 5 centimeters, 
you can find equipment that costs 
even less than the e-passport itself (see 
www.rfidiot.org). A metallic shield 
in the e-passport’s cover prevents 
the chip from being read when the 
passport is closed. This shield forms a 
Faraday cage around the chip, and to 
the best of our knowledge, only US 
passports use it.
Crypto from the 1980s
Figure 1 shows an example of the 
text found in a typical MRZ. From 
this segment, we can discern the 
document type (P for passport), 
the issuing country code (CHE 
for Switzerland), the holder’s 
name (Alice Smith), the document 
number (74HK8215), the holder’s 
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nationality (again, CHE for Swit-
zerland, but nationality and issuing 
country can differ), the holder’s 
birth date (1 April 1973) and gen-
der (female), the document’s expi-
ry date (25 December 2007), and 
several other options left up to the 
issuing country.
Basic Access Control proves to 
the chip that the reader already 
knows some part of the MRZ. It 
also derives a cryptographic ses-
sion key for secure messaging be-
tween the chip and the reader. As 
if we were still in the 1980s, this 
works with a two-key triple-data 
encryption standard (DES) and a 
kind of cipher block chaining mes-
sage authentication code (CBC-
MAC) based on another two-key 
triple-DES. 
Cryptographically speaking, 
Basic Access Control is a poor key 
agreement protocol because it isn’t 
even immune to passive adversar-
ies. A passive adversary sniffing 
(or skimming) a conversation can 
later run an offline brute-force at-
tack on MRZ information to de-
duce the secure messaging key and 
decrypt any exchange between the 
reader and the chip. A password-
based key exchange would have 
been a better choice in this case.7
The chip itself can typically 
store 512 Kbytes of data follow-
ing a standard logical data struc-
ture. Some parts only have to pass 
Basic Access Control for reading, 
but others might require an addi-
tional Extended Access Control, 
which isn’t part of the ICAO stan-
dard. Once it passes Basic Access 
Control, the reader can dump the 
security object document (SOD), 
which includes the digest of every 
file (called the data group), a digital 
signature of the list of digests, and 
the issuing agency’s X.509 cer-
tificate. Every country maintains 
its own public-key infrastructure 
(PKI) and exchanges root certifi-
cates with other countries via dip-
lomatic means. Agencies issuing 
e-passports have their own public 
key and a certificate from the PKI. 
In this way, a passive authentica-
tion mechanism verifies every data 
group’s digest.
Leaking digital 
evidence
Once it checks the SOD, the read-
er can dump data groups 1 and 2, 
which contain the MRZ and a 
facial image of the holder, respec-
tively. This way, the reader can au-
thenticate the MRZ it previously 
used to access the chip and run fa-
cial recognition on the e-passport 
holder. This further provides digi-
tal evidence that the name, gender, 
birth date, nationality, and passport 
number are correct for the person 
matching the facial picture. This 
digital proof can also be stored, 
transferred, and published—it isn’t 
comparable to a photocopy of a 
regular passport because fake pho-
tocopies can be forged, but fake 
digital signatures cannot.
With today’s e-passports, pri-
vate information is limited to the 
MRZ and a digital picture, but the 
goal is to eventually add more bio-
metrics at some point, along with a 
digitalized handwritten signature. 
Data groups 11 and 12 will also 
expand to hold additional private 
data, such as alternate names, birth 
place, mailing address, telephone 
number, profession, job title, other 
people tied to the passport (for ex-
ample, children), or even religion. 
Although they might not neces-
sarily have something to hide from 
public authorities, many people 
want to keep private data like this 
private, but that won’t be likely—
by showing your e-passport at a 
shop or a hotel check-in desk, you 
risk showing it to the entire planet 
because someone can collect your 
private data and sell it to market-
ing companies, journalists, private 
investigators, and so on. 
However, privacy enhance-
ment mechanisms do exist that 
make it possible for the chip to au-
thenticate data without releasing a 
transferable authentication proof. 
Indeed, the chip could keep the 
digital signature private and prove 
its knowledge for a valid signature 
to the reader. Very simple proto-
cols can already do this, with one 
based on the public-domain Guil-
lou-Quisquater protocol.
Regardless, e-passports still have 
some fundamental problems—for 
example, the digital format of 
an e-passport’s facial picture is 
JPEG2000, which holds metadata 
about the software and operating 
system the issuing government’s 
agencies use, thereby giving hackers 
a tremendous boost. Furthermore, 
forged JPEG2000 digital images 
can contain viruses that could in-
fect readers at immigration control 
because most border authorities use 
the same software; Lukas Grun-
wald demonstrated this particular 
vulnerability at the DefCon 2007 
Conference (www.defcon.org).
Another potential problem is the 
chip itself: fake chips can still be ex-
act copies of genuine ones, making 
it easy for criminals to create “fake” 
passports from the identities of real 
people. An optional protocol called 
Active Authentication proves a chip 
is genuine by using a public-key sig-
nature: each chip has a public key 
and signs random challenges from 
the reader to prove it knows the 
secret key. However, as far as we 
know, the only countries imple-
menting this technique are Bel-
gium and the Czech Republic. One 
drawback of this protocol is that it 
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Figure 1. Passport data. The machine readable zone (MRZ) has optical character recognition so 
that readers can instantly uncover a wealth of information about the passport holder.
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can suffer from semantic challenge 
attacks: any reader can ask a chip 
for a transferable proof that it was 
scanned at some given place at some 
given time by using regular time-
stamping techniques.8,9 Relay at-
tacks can also defeat the protocol.10
The current default biometric 
is the facial image, but the ICAO 
standard makes it possible to use 
finger and iris prints as well. How-
ever, most countries don’t go this 
far because such technology isn’t 
easy to deploy and leads to privacy 
issues. The EU considers biometric 
data to be more privacy-sensitive, 
so its countries use Extended Ac-
cess Control to protect them. The 
chip uses a static key to authen-
ticate itself to the reader, and the 
terminal authenticates itself via a 
protocol that looks like Active Au-
thentication with an extra PKI for 
readers.8 One reported problem 
with this is that e-passports aren’t 
online and have no reliable clock, 
thus they can’t get a revocation list 
or reliably check that a certificate 
is still valid.9 In other words, the 
reader could say, “here’s my public 
key…it’s valid until 1995, but we’re 
currently in 1990,” and the e-pass-
port would believe it. Another 
challenge for chips is to maintain 
an up-to-date list of PKIs belong-
ing to those countries that have 
signed the appropriate agreement 
to access privacy-sensitive data. So 
far, readers must help e-passports 
figure out whether their countries 
have been granted access through 
an as-yet-unspecified protocol.
Extended Access Control suffers 
from an additional problem—it can 
leak the digest of every privacy-sen-
sitive data group because the reader 
can read the SOD without passing 
through Extended Access Control. 
Someone who isn’t authorized to 
read a private data group but who 
already knows its content will get a 
confirmation that his or her guess is 
correct and can publish a proof of it. 
Someone who, say, knows most of 
the content of data group 11 except 
for the secret telephone number can 
find it by brute force.
D espite all this poor crypto-graphic quality, can anyone 
still have a private life with an 
e-passport? Well, most attacks 
are hardly practical and the mo-
tivation for doing so doesn’t seem 
especially clear. Nevertheless, 
these flaws should be addressed 
in future versions—especially the 
potential threat of abuse after au-
thorized access. E-passports can 
definitely improve security at the 
border, but they could also do it 
without ruining our privacy. 
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Proving knowledge of a valid signature
L et’s assume that an e-passport holds an RSA signature x for the formatted message X.1 The signature is from an issuing 
agency that uses a public key with modulus N and exponent 
e. The e-passport can prove to the reader that it holds a valid x 
without revealing it by using the GQ zero-knowledge proof. For 
that, the reader first commits to a random value c and sends the 
commitment γ  to the chip. The chip encrypts a random value 
y with RSA and sends the ciphertext Y and a random c′ to the 
reader. The reader then opens its commitment and reveals c, 
which means the chip and the prover can now compute the GQ 
challenge c + c′. Finally, the chip sends z = yxc+c′ mod N, and the 
reader can check that ze and YXc+c′ match modulo N.
ReaderE-passport
private signature: x
Formatted message: Xformatted message: X public key: N,e
pick c, δ; γ = H(c �δ)pick c’,y γ← 
Y = ye mod N Y,c ’ →
check γ = H(c �δ) δ,c← 
check ze = YXc + c(mod N)z = yxc + c’ mod N z →
Depending on a secure commitment scheme, this protocol 
is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge about x satisfying xe 
mod N = X. A pragmatic choice for the commitment would be 
to use γ = H(c||δ) with a hash function H and a random value d. 
By using small c and c’, the protocol hardly requires more than 
two RSA encryptions, which might still be faster than the Active 
Authentication protocol. The proof is further nontransferable 
after completion—that is, after the protocol completes, a mali-
cious reader can’t prove that the issuing agency ever released x. 
The only way to prove it to a third party would be to run a Mafia 
fraud attack online.
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